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Results which exceed appearances
The multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) - k.nown a's the
"Tokyo Round" because the decision to initiate them had been
taken in the Japanese capital in September 1973 by 103
nations of the world - ended on April 1979 with a general
agreement on the essential points. Their goal was to reduce
obstacles to trade in the world, and the most spectacular
element is, to all appearances, the lowering of customs duties
which will go into force at the beginning of 1980.
Nevertheless,without wishing to minimize the importance of
this aspect, the results of the MTN far exceed the simple
fact that in the future, duties will be lowered; basically
speaking:
- a new discipline in international exchanqes has been insti-
tuted
Between industrialized countries, customs duties - with the
exception of !fpeaks" remaining in a few customs tariffs - had
as obstacles to trade, become almost secondary as compared
to the regulations and restrictions of customs valuations,
of technical standards, subsidies, compensation rights, and
protectionism in natiopal markets. The MTN have helped to
, '
define (with one exception, the safeguard clause) new codes
and other legal texts on these various aspects which should if
not eliminate, at least reduce abuses and disguised protectionism
and pave the way for a freer and more harmonious development
in international exchanges.
- international trade for agricultural products will be
considerably improved and facilitated, by taking into conside--
ration the special aspects of this sector. Prior to the Tokyo
Round two major gaps (among several others) existed in the
organization of worldwide agricultural exchanges: the united
States benefited from a dispensation which allowed it not to
respect all the GATT rules and for ~0ample to apply a surcharge
on imports of subsidized products without taking into account
GATT's clear-cut regUlations in this sector; the common agricultural
policy (CAP) of the European Community was in certain of its
aspects, the object of recurring disput~s aimed at challenging_"•• '1;
....,,'...
! ~ ..
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its legitimacy.
This situation has been modified by negotiation:' the United
States will, at present," accept greater international discipline;
and the specific mechanisms of the CAP will no longer be
contested,as to;their basic principle, their application being
- as in the past - subject to GATT regulations.
- In addition, systems for permanent' consultation have been
introduced into the agricultural sector, in order' to supervise
the stabilization of world markets in view of the special
responsibility of this sector in the solution to such problems
as hunger in the world and the chronic malnutrition of entire
populations.
Protectionism and the, "world crisis'" held in check
The results of the Tokyo Round are all the more siqnificant that
they were achieved in a period of international economic
recession. In periods of expansion, it is relatively ea~y to
reduce obstacles to exchanges as imports do not contribute
to fear of unemployment or the failure of local business enter-
prises. The situation is quite different in times of recession
when the "protectionist reflex" comes into play with the
illusion that it is possible to solve problems by transfering
them to others and by closing one's borders. The multilateral
trade negotiations largely contributed to reducing this danger:
conscious of their interdependence and their responsibilities,
the leading countries or world trade-groups - headed by the
Community - turned their backs on protectionism which could
easily have' taken hold and which, in case of failure of the
negotiations, would have plunged them into a situation more
severe than that of the 30's. The Vice-President of the
European Commision, Mr. HAFERKAMP, had declared that in the
event of a world trade war, the number of unemployed in the
Community could have exceeded 10 million: social and political
tensions would have become such that the structures of European
society would undOUbtedly not have resisted.-4-
Naturally, to hold protectionism in check it would not be sufficient
to suppress the barriers to exchanges without criteria, guidelines
or precautions. The guidelines constitute the "rules of the
game" • They are the cOdes and procedures already mentioned.
The criteria concern, for example, the special advantages
granted the weaker nations, that is to say,the developing
nations, from whom the industrialized nations expect only
partial reciprocity and in some cases none at all. Precautions
refer essentially to the balancing of reciprocal concessions.
After several years of efforts, the European Commission, which
conducted negotiations on behalf of the Community, on the
advice of the Council of Ministers and in permanent contact
with the Committee of Representatives of the Member States
(Committe known as the Article 113 Committee), has considered
that the overall results are"reasonable, well-balanced and
acceptable". From th~ F,uropean Community's point of view,
the results are far.· from negligeable .:..gQals .have not all been
achieved, but in a few fields they have even been exceeded;
in return for certain concessions, the European Community
has improved its access to the American market, and, to a
lesser degree, to the Japanese market and to those of other
developed countries. The Community Ministers have also shared
this view, on the condition, of course, that the committments
subscribed to would be respected and that the decisions taken
would be completely and correctly implemented by all countries.
Protracted and sometimes difficult negotiations
The multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) were formally opened
upon the adoption of the "Tokyo declaration" by the Ministers
of 103 countries, gathered together in September 1973 in the
Japanese capital within the context of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Tokyo meeting was the result
of an initiative on the part of the United States, the European
Community and Japan who, early in 1972, had agreed upon two
joint declarations dealing with the timeliness of seeking ways
to reduce obstacles to iriternational trade. These declarations(2)
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gave the basic political impetus to the project. Following
the Tokyo meeting, negotiation structures were rapidly put into
place, in Geneva. However, the leading partners still had to
define their goals and acquire the necessary instruments of
negotiation.
For the Community, this was done in June 1973, when the Council
adopted a "global concept" specifying the goals to be attained
and the conditions for reciprocity. The government of the United
States had to wait until January 1975 that Congress in its
"Trade Act" grant it the necessary powers to negotiate. The
following month, the Community established the details of
of its negotiation stand.
After a long period of preparation, the actual discussions began
towards the middle of 1977, when a certain number of basic
divergences (concerning in particular the scope and conditions
of negotiations relative to agriculture) between the Community
and the United States were smoothed out. The criteria for
the lowering of customs duties, with, as requested by the
European Community, the acceptance of the principle according
to which the highest duties were to be reduced to a greater
degree so as to harmonize the tariff "profiles", were defined
on the basis of a formula proposed by the Swiss. The basic
agreements reached in the middle of 1977 made it possible to
establish a precise schedule for the presentation of the demand
and offers of the various participants with regards to "tariffs~
"agriculture" and "non tariff measures" (for recurring problems),
and also to achieve substantial progress in the elaboration
of codes concerning the non-tariff measures liable to find
multilateral solutions.
Towards the middle of 1978, an agreement in principle was achieved
between the leading participants,on the content of the "final
negotiation package", following a few difficult phases and
several interventions at a political level. Technical difficulties
were surmounted and the political will to succeed on the part
of the Nine as well as of the United States, Japan and the other
developed countries was confirmed. AI/joint agreement memorandum"
was pUblished in July 1978, summing up the situation and-6-
mentioning the goals still to be achieved. By the end of 1978,
the tariff negotiations, .. both in the field of industry and
agriculture, as well as the elaboration of the codes had!been
fully completed. Several months were then necessary to iron
out the last divergences and to determine the particular
conditions of reciprocal concessions. In April 1979, the
negotiators were able to initial the minutes recording the
results of the negotiations, in view of submitting them to the
respective governments and authorities. The Congress of the
united States accepted these results in July 1979. Confronted
with a Commission report on the October negotiations, the
Council of the European Community deliberated on it at its
session on October 29. In the meantime, contacts and
conversations were being pursued with the developing countries
and with a few developed countries, among which Australia,
with a view to completing the negotiations on specific points.
A tariff protocol finalizing details of the tariff negotiations
between industrialized countries was signed in July and an
additional tariff protocol was established in November to
enable other countries, principally the developing countries,
to include their concessions.
It was not possible to conclude negotiations on one point alone,
the new procedures and guidelines concerning the safeguard
clause to be included in the GATT. Discussions on this subject
will continue outside the Tokyo Round, and in the meantime the
GATT's existing IIclausell remains valid.
Lowered Customs Tariffs
Customs duties throughout the worM had already been reduced
in the past in preceding negotiations. There remained never-
theless, certain particularly high customs duties, specially
within certain "irregular" tariffs which were composed of
very high duties next to others which were very low. The
Tokyo Round provides for a new generalized lowering of tariff rates
by close to one third by the leading trade partners (European
Community, united States and Japan in particular) and the
total suppression of duties in a significant sector, aeronautics.-7-
Reductions will not be Illinear", that is to say that they will
not be identical in their percentage: the duties which at present
are the highest and which are to be reduced according to the
so-called Swiss formula, will be subject to greater reductions
than others. This will decrease the difference between the
customs tariffs of the leading partners in international trade.
The customs duty rates of the European Community will, for
the greatest part be of 5% to 10%; as few as 180 duties out
of several thousand included in the Community's customs tariff'
will exceed 10% and only one (the rate applied to lorry imports)
will exceed 20%. This homogeneous tariff will continue to
constitute an important element of cohesion for the Community
and will enable it to maintain reasonable protection with
regard to outside pressures. For sectors with special
economic and social conditions, the present reduction of duties
will be small or non-existent: automobiles, lorries, shoes,
fertilizers, and certain plastic and chemical products. In
IIsensitive II sectors such as the textile sector, protection is
not provided by customs duties alone, but by quantitative
agreements ("multifibre" international agreement).
The United States will reduce its tariff by close to a third.
Thus, most of its imports will be subject to customs duties
inferior to 5%; a few dusties superior to 20% and even 30%
will nevertheless still remain. In its final list, the
United States thus tends to eliminate restrictions and to
suppress the "American Selling Price".
Japan will reduce its tariff by almost one half if one takes
into consideration the legal tariff (which, in fact, was
not applied for several years), and by one quarter if
the duties actually applied are taken into account. The
profile of the Japanese tariff will be quite similar to that
of the European Community (most duties will be inferior to 5%)
but more 15% to 20% "peaks" will remain. The incidence of the
Tokyo Round tariff reduction on the other industrialized
countries will be less important particularly in view of the
fact that the European Community already applies reciprocal
exemptions in its exchanges with most of the Western European
nations such as Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Finland
and Iceland.-8-
Among the results, the following should also be mentioned: the
total suppression among the leading industrial countries as a whole,
of customs duties in the civil aeronautics sector, beginning
in 1980. The Community had, in practice, already suspended
the application of duties on its aircraft import: it finally has
obtained total reciprocity, particularly significant for the
Airbus sales to the United States and Japan, in addition to
an extended application to exchanges of other products of this
sector as well as to spare parts.
In general, the customs reductions will be spread out over
a period of eight years, from 19BO to 19B7, accelerated in
certain cases such as in the field of aeronautics, as already
mentioned. After the firs five stages of reduction, the
European Community will examine the situation to decide on
proceeding to the final three stages, if disarming is pursued.
The reductions as a whole should be in force by the beginninq
of 19B7 at the latest.
Freer and more stable agricultural exchanges
The specific character of the agricutural sector, which tbe
European Community has asserted from the start, and which has
finally come to be recognized by all, has led to special solutions
taking into account the fact that duties do not constitute in
themselves the essential element regulating exchanges. For
a few basic products - cereals, dairy products, beef - the
goal was to set up special international arrangements and
in two out of the three cases (with the exception of cereals)
this goal was achieved. The principles and mechanisms of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Community
were not called into question even in the aspects which had
been challenged in the past (namely export refunds).
Only one important setback was noted: the failure to obtain in
due time an international arrangement for cereals. The nego-
tiations on this subject will continue outside the Tokyo
Round. The arrangement on dairy products includes information
and cooperation procedures for the sector as a whole, and price-9-
guidelines for powdered mi+k, butter, butteroil and cheese
products, The beef arrangement is based on a mutual information
mechanism and on a system of multilateral consultations in case
of problems in the world market. In addition, it set up an
"advisory organism on aqricultural problems".
These arrangements and procedures are completed by specific
nation-to-nation concesssions. The European Community has
in ~articular, obtained freer access to the American market for
cheese products, alcohols, spirits and beef in exchange for
certain concessions on poultry and on a special variety of table
grapes and for a few arrangements concerning the importing
of tobacco, rice and prime quality beef.
Among other positive results for Europe, the improved access
obtained for cheese products (Canada, Australia, Japan), for
alcoholic drinks (Canada, New Zealand, Japan) and for products
of the agro-alimentary industry should be mentioned. In exchange,
the European Community will stabilize the regulation of its own
imports of beef and of certain dairy products corning from
various countries.
Improved discipline and more balanced development of international
exchanges.
The reduction, and even suppression, of customs duties would
not be very significant were the possibility of introducing
other obstacles to trade, of applying discriminatory measures
on foreign products or products originating in certian areas,
of applying, whenever one chooses, compensation duties, of
excluding certain sectors from international competition, not
contained and disciplined. It is for this reason that the
defining of new, more clear-cut and more equitable rules for
international exchanges constitutes one of the most important
results of the Tokyo Round, without which the customs reductions
would have led to advantages that were simply illusory or at
the least uncertain and short-lived.-10-
At the same time, however, it would have been unthikable - for
the European Community as for the other nations - to grant
partners excessive "inspection rights" over domestic legislation
and conduct, which are dictated at times by legitimate and
urgent demands (for example, when public health is involved).
A balance has, in general, been achieved after long and compli-
cated negotiations. The "codes" elaborated as a result, improve
and update the rules and procedures governing world trade, by
facilitating the suppression or reduction of a number of non-
tariff barriers to exchanges and by improving supervision.
The new rules cover the following fields:
- code on the technical obstacles to trade, concerning obstacles
resulting f~om the fact that the compulsory technical standards
for a large number of industrial products (cars, electrical
machinery, household appliances, etc.) are not the same from
one country to another. The new agreement introduces procedures
which, while respecting the right to establish the standards
which protect the health and safety of consumers and utilizers,
aim at avoiding discriminations and "disguised protectionism"
(the possibility to protect national production by imposing
standards which create problems that are often insurmountable
for foreign producers).
Code on Government purchases. This code aims to eliminate legis-
lation or administrative practices which channel government
purchases to national suppliers or which provide price preferences
for thes purchases. The goal has only been partially
achieved; but the code nevertheless opens exceptionally important
markets to European industries while naturally guaranteeing
a certain reciprocity. This presents two advantages: for the
firms, which will benefit from a widening of their markets, and
the governments which will benegit from broadened competition.
- code on subsidies and compensation rights. The goal of this
code is to put an end to the arbitrary introduction of compen-
sation rights on importing by guaranteeing a uniform application
of the GATT provisions. The imbalance between rights and-11-
obligations which previously existed has been eliminated. On
the other hand, new procedures for the discussion of domestic
subsidies which could adversely affect international trade,
have been established.
- anti-dumping code which aims at prohibiting practices which
consist of penetrating foreign markets by selling at prices
below the normal price. In this case, the goal has also been
to eliminate the discrepancies between the various countires
in their application of GATT rules. Procedures have been more
clearly defined.
- code on import licences and code on customs valuations
(namely, the manner in which the value on imported products
is calculated in view of applying an ad valorem customs duty
to these). These codes cover technical fields, which, however,
are of considerable importance to importers and exporters and
to the legalbasis for stability of axchanges. The same can be said of
the agreement which aims at discouraging the exchange of
spurious merchandise.
~n agreement on a new safequard clause was not reached. At
the present time, should a country note that imports of
a given product provoke serious perturbations on its market,
it can adopt measures of protection, which, however, according
to a certain interpretation of existing rules, must be applied
to all exporting countries. The new clause under consideration
would establish criteria for the application of "selective"
measures exclusively to products from certain sources having
caused the serious prejudice observed. Certain of the
developing countries opposed the clause, fearing that, in
practice, the "selective clause" would be more often directed
against their products. Nevertheless, the problem remains
extremely urgent for a large number of GATT countries and the
European Community will continue to explore the possibilities
of an agreement after the Tokyo Round.